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I. An extravagant introduction
It is only natural that my generation is asked about what happened to the 
European Portugal.
We were almost thirty years old, or maybe a bit older, on 12th July 1985, when the 
Treaty of  Accession of  the “peninsular peoples” (as Antero would say) to the EEC was 
signed in Jerónimos. On 3rd October 1990, when Germany celebrated its reunification 
with the inclusion of  GDR in the Federal Republic, we were reaching the age of  
reason, the thirties are almost gone and the forties are very close. And now, in the 
age of  reason, we were surprised by the 23rd June referendum vote in the UK to leave 
the EU. The trajectory of  the European Portugal mingles with the path of  our adult 
life. For that, it is very natural that this question is posed to us: what happened to that 
trajectory? But from my part, the response to the question (or the patient search for 
the answer: it would be foolish to assume that I have some) cannot be given without 
a previous “declaration of  interests” as it is trendy to say nowadays. I loved the European 
Portugal and the Europe in which it developed. I lived every single of  its moments 
believing in them: I was in Paris when the celebration of  the two hundred years of  
the French Revolution took place; in Germany when the reunification occurred and 
I was still around when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. I was one of  those who 
thought that 1989 was the end of  the twentieth century. For those reasons, I am also 
among those who today ask themselves, not only where European Portugal is but, 
what has been made of  Europe – that Europe that Tony Judt foresaw as a potential 
“grand illusion” if  one day, with the combination of  the eastward enlargement and the 
establishment of  the single currency, designed in accordance with the bases of  the 
German ordoliberalism, the winds of  divergence convened.2
In the day of  Brexit, I was in Slovenia, in the magnificent Habsburghian 
landscape of  Lake Bled, representing the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of  which 
(in June 2016) I was still a member. On that day, the constitutional courts of  Member 
States – with exception of  Hungary’s and Poland’s – gathered to celebrate the 25 
years of  the Slovenian Republic, hosted by the Slovenian Court. The President of  
the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) also attended; and we passed 
all that day enthusiastically discussing the relations between Luxembourg and 
Karlsruhe, the relations between Luxembourg and Madrid; the relations between 
Luxembourg and Rome; the relations between Luxembourg and Brussels. The 
plurilevel constitutionalism was on stage. We debated the Judgment of  the CJEU on 
the request for preliminary ruling sent by Spanish Constitutional Court in the case 
Melloni.3 We talked about the decision of  the Luxembourg Court on a preliminary 
ruling sent by Bundesverfassungsgericht regarding the prohibition of  monetary financing 
to the countries of  the Eurozone.4 We discussed the situation of  the Belgian 
Constitutional Court, champion of  the preliminary ruling requests, made by the 
national constitutional jurisdiction to the Court of  the Union. It, was therefore, the 
big stage of  the construction of  the European legal space through the dialogue 
between courts literally done in the lingua franca that English is. Discussion ended, 
and on the following day, we came to know that one of  the peoples of  a Member 
2 T. Judt, “A grand illusion? An Essay on Europe”. This essay results from a series of  conferences that 
the Tony Judt attended during the nineties. The author refered the Portuguese edition, T. Judt, “Uma 
grande ilusão? Um ensaio sobre a Europa”(Lisboa: Edições 70, 2013) – translator’s note.
3 Judgment Melloni, 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11. 
4 Case C- 62/14, 16 June 2015.
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State, whose language we had used the previous day, decided to leave the Union. 
Nothing in this introduction follows the style and demands of  a scientific 
colloquium. I believe, however, that the theme that I will approach from now 
deserves my transgression, or the excuse of  a personal note.
II. The Constituent was not European
The Constituent Assembly that approved the first version of  the 40 years old 
Constitution that we celebre today was not an ‘European’ assembly. It is certain that 
most of  the constitutional projects did have Europe as a mentor. But the Europe 
that was in mind for those projects had no institutional feature. It corresponded 
to a pool of  ideas: a tradition of  thinking and political practices that embodied the 
concept of  an occidental constitution, and according to the connotation that the 
term occidental had at the time.  Therefore, the Constitution of  the Republic of  
Portugal (CRP) was not born as the Italian (1947), the Spanish (1978) or the German 
(1949). In its original version, dating from 1947, the Italian Constitution already 
contained a European clause, even if  at the time, nothing European existed yet. Its 
Article 11 said that: “Italy agrees, on conditions of  equality with other States, to the limitations 
of  sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. 
Italy promotes and encourages international organisations furthering such ends”. In the same 
way, pursuant to the Bonn Basic Law stated in Article 23; (and that already suffered 
many revisions) “the Federation may transfer sovereignty through the law and with the approval 
of  the Federal Council (Bundesrat)”. Although by the end of  the forties, the European 
integration was no more than a foresight, the Italian and German constitutions 
prepared for it through an express entitlement, addressed to the respective States, 
of  the transference of  ‘Sovereign rights’ to whatever supranational organization 
that could emerge in the future. It is not surprising that Italy and Germany were 
the losers in the War. Italy and Germany were the first interested in any European 
project. The Spain of  1978 was as well. For that reason, the original version of  the 
its Constitution – that indeed is not coincident with the current version because the 
text now includes, in Article 135, the so-called budgetary ‘golden clause’, regarding the 
limits of  public debt and the deficit required by the Union’s rules - already authorised 
Spain to celebrate treaties that would attribute to organizations (the supranational 
term is expressly used) “the exercise of  competences deriving from the Constitution”. The 
CRP in its original version did not entail any of  this and could not foresee it. The 
concerns of  the Portuguese Constituent Assembly were different. The “European 
project” was only part of  the Constitutional language with the constitutional revisions, 
in a fragmentary and, sometimes, (in my view) confusing way.  
I do not intend to make the exegesis of  that language (Article 7, paragraphs 5, 6 
and 7; Article 8, paragraphs 3 and 4). If  I recalled the historical events that I mentioned 
above, it is only with one intention: I will identify when the moment was that the 
Portuguese constitutional system made the “European decision”. To those who would 
like to analyse what the “European Portugal” was from that national constitutional 
perspective, that identification is necessary since only form there one can spot the 
design that this decision found. I would say that since that design only took shape 
after the constitutional tension between 1976-1982 (tension that reflected the main 
indecision regarding the political system to be followed), it will be closely linked with 
the key questions to be solved from 1982 onwards. The option for Europe, in Portugal, 
was made at the same time the choice for the constitutional democracy (Article 3 
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paragraph 1) or for the rule of  law (Article 2), became clear in the “internal system”, as 
we started referring to our model of  governance. That was the model adopted by the 
remaining members of  the then EEC. As it was that model of  governance that we 
wanted to safeguard the option for Europe was enshrined in the 1982 version of  the 
CRP as an instrument of  reinforcement of  the internal constitutional order. When 
strictly seen from this perspective, the project of  the European Portugal presented a 
clearly instrumental side, as did all the other options that serve an external end, beyond 
the “good” that this decision, in itself, entails. It helped to strengthen the democracy. 
It consolidated the end of  the so-called “constitutional quarrel”. It contributed to make 
the reversibility of  the internal model that finally was reached more difficult. Beyond 
these instrumental purposes, the constitutional process of  the European Portugal 
presented a side of  historical inevitability. Redefined for the first time in the history 
of  Portuguese Constitutionalism, the national territory, delimited by the boarders 
of  the continent and the archipelagos, and the closing of  (so dramatically late in the 
concert of  nations) the circle of  Portuguese expansion, would have to delineate the 
reinsertion of  Portugal in the world. Europe appeared to that necessary reinsertion 
as an inevitability. If  those were, from the strict point of  view of  the constitutional 
language, the designs of  the European Portugal, there is no doubt that 40/30 years 
passed that the designs were fulfilled. It remains to analyse the present.
III. Sovereignty and self-determination
The evaluation of  the present situation is such a challenging endeavour to 
which I cannot simply abide. I might have ‘personal’ impressions that I mentioned in 
the introduction to this text, but I do not own the necessary instruments to evaluate 
with rigour the historical mutations that we see today. 
I will say, therefore, that only when seen from the prism of  national constitutional 
law, the European Portugal path is the trajectory of  any other Member State of  
the Union that has authorised transferences of  sovereignty in favour of  a common 
entity that integrates all. For the dogmatic sphere of  constitutional law, this is the 
identifying trace of  the European Sonderweg; a set of  national fundamental systems, 
in which each of  them warrants the entities of  the political community, created 
by that system to entitle or transfer to the entities of  that polity, or other political 
community, “competences deriving from the Constitution”, as the Spanish say. To affirm this 
is the same as saying that the dogmatic sphere of  constitutional law will look into the 
current state of  Sonderweg through certain and determined prisms; and that in those 
prisms will be, before anything else, written the word sovereignty and the legal meaning 
that shall be attributed to such a term after thirty years of  integration. To consider 
that this point of  view is worthless because it opens a discussion merely semantic 
or nominal, I do not think it would be right. It seems appropriate to undertake the 
discussion: for all the motives, including the one that at a first sight might seem more 
futile – refuting common, imprecise, unscrutinised language regarding this subject 
that, at least in our public sphere, takes place. 
For a long time now, we know that the concept of  sovereignty can no longer 
be understood as it was in the beginning of  the Westphalian era, as if  it was a legal 
concept. The idea that a ‘supreme power’ could only be conceptualized as a pure 
fact, placed beyond the law, was bluntly denied by the science of  public law of  the 
beginning of  the twentieth century, withdrawing it from the universe of  ‘concepts of  
pure facts’. Jellinek, Kelsen, Malberg and Hart solved the aporia of  its incompatibility 
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[incompatibility of  the sovereign entities] with any legal attachments. There is not 
any incompatibility between sovereignty and submission to the law. We have known 
that for an almost a century now. This way, there is no incompatibility between the 
condition that is proper of  a sovereign State and its accession to historical processes 
that imply the increasing interlacing, or the increasing interdependence of  the 
different national state systems.
The problem that the European Sonderweg points out today does not lie in the 
process of  increasing interlacing. The new problem that we face today, and that arises 
clearly due to sovereign debt crises, is that we do not know who guides that process. I believe 
that the vicissitudes lived in the process of  European integration after the so-called 
‘crises of  the sovereign debts’ illustrates well this affirmation, in the exact measure that the 
“crises” reveal what changed in relation to the past. Furthermore, I do not believe that 
it is excessive to identify such past, in relation to which the ‘crisis’ reveals a certain 
discontinuity, considering the capacity that all the subjects of  the integration had – 
and no longer do – to guide the process of  the increasing interlacing.
In a time when one could safeguard such a guiding force was still in the 
sphere of  the interlacing subjects – the states. There was still space for a theoretical 
representation of  state “sovereignty” that would conciliate with its belonging to the 
universe of  public law itself. That space could be occupied by the idea of  ‘self-
determination’, that would work as synonym of  the idea of  ‘sovereignty’, recovered from 
the universe of  fact-concepts. But the problem that we face today is not knowing 
if  the world-of-facts, that in the meantime took over, saves any room for this 
understanding of  sovereignty as self-determination. It remains to be seen – and for this 
question I have no answer – if  this is a new problem that the integration process, in 
its most recent manifestations and avatars, raised itself  or if  this is a new problem 
brought by the national constitutional law not only because of  the course that the 
European project took but, moreover, because of  the general course that the world 
took with so-called globalization. It is also the globalization that forces us to rethink 
all the problems brought by the disjunction between de-facto-powers and de jure 
powers - a disjunction that is renewed by the transformations brought by technology 
and by the challenges launched by economic governance. But this is other issue, that 
will be tackled in other colloquium and not in the one celebrating the forty years of  
the Constitution and the thirty of  the integration.
